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ARTICLES
BFOQ: AN EXCEPTION BECOMING THE RULE
RONALD J. JAMES* AND MICHAEL A. ALAIMO**
N DECEMBER 15, 1967, PRESIDENT JOHNSON signed into law the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).' The purpose of the Act,
as defined in the preamble, is to "promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment; to help employers and workers to find ways in meet-
ing problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 2 The
ADEA prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor organiza-
tions from engaging in age-based discriminatory practices against indi-
viduals within the Act's protected age group, forty to sixty-five. 3
There are three statutory exemptions to the Act's prohibition. The
most noteworthy is section 4(f)l of the ADEA, which states in perti-
nent part that, "[ilt shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take
any action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business." 4
Recent court decisions interpreting section 4(f)1 of the Act and de-
fining BFOQ exemptions have done little to promote employment of or
prohibit discrimination against older Americans. Nor have the decisions
helped employers or workers understand applicable BFOQ standards.
In essence, recent court decisions have so distorted the BFOQ exemption
as to gut the lofty intent of the law set forth in the preamble.
The Seventh Circuit, in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,5 held
that the defendant's refusal to hire any bus drivers over the age of forty
involved a bona fide occupational qualification, and was therefore ex-
empt under the Act. The Fifth Circuit, in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 6 reached the same decision in an almost identical fact situation.
Conversely, in Houghton v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.' the Eighth Cir-
cuit did not follow the Greyhound and Tamiami decisions and held, in
* Partner, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. Formerly Administrator, Wage
and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor. Portions of this article were presented be-
fore the National Council on the Aging.
" Student, Georgetown University Law Center. Formerly Special Assistant to Admin-
istrator, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor.
I Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). It should be noted that the Act was
made a part of the much more inclusive Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1970), which was originally enacted in 1938.
4 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)(1970).
5 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
6 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
7 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3351 (1977).
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effect, that the removal of a test pilot from flight status simply because
he had reached the age of fifty-two did not qualify as a BFOQ defense.
It is the purpose of this article to examine these recent court deci-
sions, to assess the court's misapplication of their own historic BFOQ
test, and to attempt to probe the source of this judicial failure.
I. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S VIEW
In its interpretive bulletin, the Department of Labor stated that the
determination of a bona fide occupational qualification would be based
on "all the pertinent facts surrounding each particular situation. ' The
Department added that: "It is anticipated that this concept of a bona fide
occupational qualification will have limited scope and application.
Further, as this is an exception it must be construed narrowly, and the
burden of proof in establishing that it applies is the responsibility of the
employer .. .9
As an example of such a BFOQ, the bulletin offered federal statutory
or regulatory age limitations imposed "for the safety and convenience of
the public,"'0 as where the Federal Aviation Administration refuses to
allow pilots over the age of sixty to engage in carrier operations. This
narrow interpretation closely followed court decisions involving previous
Fair Labor Standards Act exceptions. 1 In addition, the Department was
not unmindful that the "administrative interpretation of the act by the
enforcing agency is entitled to great deference." 12
Many commentators felt that because the language of the Act's
BFOQ provision was almost identical to that of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, it would be accorded similar treatment by the courts.'3
The initial court decisions interpreting the ADEA seemed to bear this
out."
II. GREYHOUND AND TAMIAMI: DIFFERENT BFOQ
DISTORTIONS, SAME RESULT
On October 29, 1969, the Secretary of Labor filed suit in federal dis-
trict court against Greyhound Lines, Inc., seeking to enjoin the company
from enforcing its policy of not hiring individuals between the ages of
8 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1976).
1 Id.
10 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(d) (1976).
11 "It is well settled that exemptions for the Fair Labor Standards Act are to be narrowly
construed." Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295 (1959). See Arnold v. Ben
Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960); Idaho Metal Works v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 206
(1966) (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowski, Inc.).
12 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971). See Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 4 (1965).
13 See Freed & Dowell, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 196 (1972); Note, Protecting the Older Worker, 6 U. MiCH. J. L. REF. 214;
Note, Proving Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 17 Amz.
L. REV. 495 (1975).
14 See Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1974); Schulz v. Hickock Mfg.




forty and sixty-five. 15 The defendant company claimed that its policy
fell within the BFOQ exception to the Act. 16  As a public carrier, the
company argued, it was responsible for the safety of its passengers.
17
The duties of an intercity bus driver are arduous, especially for "extra-
board" drivers - those who have no scheduled run but perform on the
basis of passenger demand, and who handle special operations such as
extra buses on regular runs.' Union agreements required that all new
drivers work extra-board until they had sufficient seniority to bid for a
regularly scheduled run.19 Further, the aging process results in de-
generative changes which have impact upon a driver's ability to perform;
such effects as increased difficulty in night driving due to changes in
visual sensory capacity, and increased likelihood of heart attacks, 2 are
not easily detectable upon physical examination. 2' It was argued that
the only factor which compensates for this degeneration is experience.
22
Newly-hired drivers have no such compensating experience, however,
and yet must work the most difficult job of extra-board.2 3 Hence, the
company reasoned, it would be extremely dangerous to hire older in-
dividuals as new intercity bus drivers, a practice which would violate
the company's duty as a public carrier as well.
The trial court, in examining the evidence, looked to see "whether
or not Greyhound ha[d] established a 'factual basis' for its belief that
applicants between the ages of 40 and 65 would be unable to perform
safely the duties of an extra-board driver."2 4 It found to the contrary
that Greyhound's policy was not based on any statistical evidence, per-
sonal experience, or observations.2 5  Having found for the department,
the trial court permanently enjoined the company from continuing its
discriminatory hiring policy.26
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.2 7 The
circuit court found that Greyhound's claim raised "compelling concerns
15 Hogdson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1974). In fact, the company's hiring policy precluded acceptance of anyone
over the age of 35, but due to the requirements of the ADEA only that portion of the
policy which affected the protected age group was contested. Id. at 231.
,1 Id. at 232.
17 Id. at 231.
11 id. at 235.
19 Id. at 231.
20 Id. at 233.
21 Id. at 231.
22 Id. at 236.
23 Only that previous experience gained in employment with the company was consid-
ered. No other previous work experience, even with another bus company, was counted.
Id. at 237.
24 Id. at 236. The standard of proof was adopted by the court from Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). See note 40 infra and accompanying
text.
25 Hogdson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230, 236, 238 (N.D. I11. 1973).
26 Id. at 239.
27 Hogdson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1122 (1975).
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for safety"2 which entitled the company to meet a lesser burden of
proof. It rejected the standard adopted by the district court and instead
looked to a Tenth Circuit decision, Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.,29
which involved the validity of pre-employment job qualifications for the
position of airline pilot which allegedly discriminated against blacks.
Quoting the Spurlock decision, the Seventh Circuit held that "when a job
clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risk
in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a cor-
respondingly lighter burden to show his employment criteria are job-
related." 30  Accordingly, the circuit court found that Greyhound need
only "demonstrate that it has a rational basis in fact to believe that elimi-
nation of its maximum hiring age will increase the likelihood of risk of
harm to its passengers." 31 Since the court was not sure that functional
age as opposed to chronological age was "readily or practically deter-
minable,"32 and since it agreed with the company that the job of an
intercity bus driver was physically and mentally demanding,3 3 it con-
cluded that Greyhound had established that its hiring policy "is founded
upon good faith judgment concerning the safety needs of its passengers
and others" and "is not the result of an arbitrary belief lacking in objec-
tive reason or rationale."3 4
There has been considerable criticism of the Greyhound decision.35
It has been argued by at least one commentator that the court of appeals,
despite its assertions to the contrary, applied the same legal test as the
lower court and should not have reversed because the trial court's deci-
sion was not clearly erroneous. 38 Presuming the same test was applied
by both appellate and trial courts, there was sufficient evidence to sus-
tain the lower court's finding. However, the language of the opinion
makes it clear that the Seventh Circuit placed a substantially lighter
burden upon the defendant.37
In a parallel case, Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,3 8 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided the same issue, maximum hiring age
21 Id. at 863.
29 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
31 Hogdson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1974).
31 Id. at 863.
32 Id. at 864.
w Id.
31 Id. at 865.
See generally Kavorski & Kavorski, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the
Age Discrimination Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 839, 897-901 (1974); Note,
The Constitutional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 748
(1975); 16 B.C. INous. & CoM. L. REV. 688 (1975).
36 See 16 B.C. INfUs & CoM. L. REV. 688 (1975).
37 Compare the district court's standard, "whether or not Greyhound has established a
'factual basis' for its belief that applicants between the ages of 40 and 65 would be unable
to perform safely," 354 F. Supp. at 236, with that of the appellate court: "Greyhound need
only demonstrate however a minimal increase in risk of harm for it is enough to show that
elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than might
otherwise occur under the present hiring practice." 499 F.2d at 863 (emphasis added).




limitation as a BFOQ, and reached the same conclusion by a different
rationale.39 Fifth Circuit litigation in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone Co.40 and Diaz v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc.,41 relating
to the BFOQ provisions under Title VII, had yielded a two-pronged test
for determining the existence of such a qualification. The first prong
of this test, under Diaz, required that the alleged BFOQ must be reason-
ably necessary to the essence of the business being conducted.
4 2
Secondly, under Weeks the employer had the burden of proving either
that "he had reasonable cause to believe, that, is a factual basis for be-
lieving, that all or substantially all of [the protected group] would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved" 43
or that "it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with [the protected
group] on an individualized basis." 4 4
In Usery, the Florida district court applied the Weeks test to the facts
presented.45  It found that the "essence of the motor carriage of pas-
sengers is safety." 46  Further, "if the employment of drivers over age
forty would undermine that safety, the maximum age standard utilized
by defendant is 'reasonably necessary' within the meaning of the bona fide
occupational qualification exception to the act."47  Expert testimony
proved to the court's satisfaction that "few men over forty have those
physical and mental abilities possessed by most men under forty, which
are fundamental to ensure a continuous and controlled safety factor in
operations," 4 and that "functional age, as distinguished from chronolog-
ical age, of a driver applicant cannot be determined with sufficient
reliability."49  Thus, the defendant had proven that its policy was re-
lated to a business necessity, and that it was justified because all or
substantially all male applicants over forty were unable to perform ade-
quately and because there was no practical way to sort out individually
the adequate from the inadequate. The Department of Labor appealed,
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion.50
39Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
40 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
41 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950.
42 Diaz v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
4 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
44 Id. at 235 n. 5.
45 Not only were the issues involved in Usery the same as those in Weeks, but both
cases involved intercity bus firms. The plaintiff and defendant in Usery also used the same
expert witnesses. The National Association of Motorbus Carriers participated as amicus
curiae, as it had in Greyhound, and representatives of Greyhound Lines, Inc. testified
at trial on behalf of Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. Compare Brief for Appellee at 10, 13, 14,
18, 19, Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), with Brief for
Appellant at 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 20, Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th
Cir. 1974).
4 Hogdson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6047, 6050 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
4 Id.
4 Id. at 6052.
4 Id. at 6051.
0 Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
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The Fifth Circuit's decision is also open to criticism. First, the court
failed to demand the "factual basis" required under Weeks. 51 There
was testimony from the employer's sole medical expert 52 but the objec-
tive data upon which his opinion was based was nowhere evidenced.-
Standing alone, this testimony offered little support for an exception to
a Congressionally-mandated presumption. The Seventh Circuit appar-
ently did not feel that the objective data required by Weeks could be
met. For this reason, they were unwilling to use that formula when de-
ciding Greyhound, and instead adopted a much weaker one of their own.
Secondly, it appears that the appellate court misunderstood the trial
court's decision. The Fifth Circuit stated that at the trial the company
had refrained from attempting to prove that all or substantially all males
over forty were incapable, but had successfully proven the impractical-
ity of attempting to screen out those applicants who were not accept-
able.54  In fact, the district court had found that both portions of the
Weeks test had been proven.55
Upon examination of the Weeks test, it is clear that both portions of
the test should be proven in order to justify an exemption. Only when
substantially all of the suspect group can be proven to be incapable,
and there is no practical way of sorting out the capable from the others,
does it make sense to exclude the suspect group as a group. If sub-
stantially all are incapable, but there exists a practical way of differ-
entiating between those capable and those incapable, it makes little
sense to exclude the entire group. If, on the other hand, there is no way
to make a determination among members of the affected group, but
substantially all of the group are capable, it is arguable that the risk is
probably no greater than for the rest of humanity. Indeed, the result of
using the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Tamiami would be to disqualify all
drivers regardless of their age, since the trial court found as fact that
"functional age . . . cannot be determined with sufficient reliability." 56
III. ADDED CONFUSION: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT STRIKES OFF
IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION?
Since Greyhound and Tamiami, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Houghton v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.57 that the age of fifty-
two did not qualify as a BFOQ defense for the occupation of test pilot.
The district court had adopted the company's position that age is an ap-
propriate BFOQ for production test pilots. The court found as fact that
"portions of the [test] flight commonly occur in the vicinity of a major
51 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
52 Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 237 (5th Cir. 1976).
- Id. at 237-38. See also Brief for Appellee at 36-37, Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
m Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236, 238 (5th Cir. 1976).
m Hodgson v. Tarniami Trail Tours, Inc., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6047, 6051 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
- Id. at 6051.




city with the attendant danger to the general population in the event of
an accident or crash."," In addition, it found that a "test pilot must
perform his duties under conitions of psychological and physiological
stress." 59
Aging, the district court felt, results in a gradual deterioration of
the bodily functions to such an extent that "in general those over the
age of sixty can be said to have aged" and that "such age-related de-
teriorations are not always detected or even detectable." 60 In applying
the test developed and used by the Fifth Circuit in Tamiami, the court
concluded that since there was "no practical way to determine plaintiff
Houghton's functional age, the Court is of the opinion that defendant
McDonnell was clearly acting within its rights to use plaintiff Hough-
ton's chronological age for determining whether or not the plaintiff
would be a sufficiently safe test pilot."6'
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Retired Supreme Court Justice
Clark, sitting by designation, noted that "it was shown that medical
technology can predict a disabling physical condition in a test pilot with
fool proof accuracy."6 2 Ironically, the Greyhound-Tamiami courts were
uncertain as to the ability of medical technology to predict physical con-
ditions in a bus driver. Justice Clark, quoting Weeks, noted that "to
uphold the finding [sustaining age as a BFOQ defense] of the District
Court in the face of this evidence would [allow] the exception [to] swal-
low the rule." 63 Justice Clark also noted that the district court had en-
tered judgment for the company despite a "mountain of evidence against
the company position."6 4
At first blush, one would think that the decision would be cause for
celebration among the Grey Panthers, and if nothing else, would pro-
vide some degree of certainty in the law for employers. However, the
decision can and probably will be interpreted narrowly. First, the case is
not applicable to the Greyhound-Tamiami situation in which an em-
ployer has imposed an age limitation on new, inexperienced hires.
Rather, McDonneU-Douglas dealt with the termination. of an experienced
employee simply because of age. Second, the Greyhound decisions
placed emphasis on experience as a compensating factor for age-related
disabilities. Likewise, Justice Clark found experience to be a remedial
factor: "the major cause of accidents is poor pilot judgment, a factor
which experience alone can remedy."6 5 In this context, despite the
contrary results, the rationale of the two courts is quite similar. Third,
the decision involves professional pilots, a small and select group of
5 Houghton v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd,
553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3351 (1977).
5 Id.
60 Id. at 1236.
61 Id. at 1238.
62 Houghton v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1977).
13 Id.
64 Id.
61 Id. at 563-64.
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Americans. There should not be great expectations, therefore, that the
favorable treatment of the plaintiff in McDonnell-Douglas will be ac-
corded to all of those in the protected age group, particularly since
the Development of Labor's evidence showed that aging occurs more
slowly and to a lesser degree among professional pilots than the general
population. 6
The fourth and final reason for caution is the fact that the opinion
of Justice Clark, as originally written, contained some rather broad and
.expansive language which clearly would have made the case applicable
on a broader scale. However, the amended opinion after the petition
for rehearing en banc before the Eighth Circuit deleted some very in-
structive language. In the original circuit court opinion, for example,
after noting "that medical technology can predict a disabling physical
condition in a test pilot with virtually foolproof accuracy; ' '6" Justice
Clark went on to add that "it follows that the likelihood of disability
simply by age is highly remote. '68 This latter deletion will give added
weight to the argument that the decision should be narrowly construed.
Another Eight Circuit district court opinion also does not provide
much solace for slightly older Americans, despite its favorable result.
In Aaron v. Davis, two firefighters were terminated under a city statute
requiring mandatory retirement at age sixty-two.69 The city argued
that age sixty-two qualified as a BFOQ for firefighters, since the work
was arduous and the safety of the public and fellow firefighters was
involved.70
In evaluating the city's BFOQ defense, the court employed the follow-
ing test:
where the degree of such risks is high and methods of avoiding
same (alternative to the method of a mandatory retirement age)
are inadequate or unsure, then the more arbitrary may be the
fixing of the mandatory retirement age. But at no point will
the law permit, within the age bracket designated by the statute,
the fixing of a mandatory retirement age based entirely on
hunch, intuition or stereotyping, i.e., without any empirical
justification. 71
The city had offered no empirical justification for its retirement age.
The court concluded that this failure on the part of the defendant was
fatal to its BFOQ defense, and ordered reinstatement and back pay for
both of the plaintiffs.
The court, in these authors' opinions, could not understand why the
city could not continue to employ the two individuals for another three
m Id. at 563.
67 Id. at 564.
6 Houghton v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., No. 76-1652, slip op. at 6 (8th Cir., May 11,
1977) (Clark, 1.).
" Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
10 Id. at 459, 461.




years until retired at age sixty-five like other city employees. The city's
inability to produce any objective data to support its retirement policy
probably made the statute appear more arbitrary and capricious than it
might otherwise. The case is, therefore, only instructive as to a situation
where an employer does nothing to justify the BFOQ.
IV. SOURCES AND REASONS
To better understand recent BFOQ decisions, an analysis of the legis-
lative history of ADEA is instructive. One is struck by the paucity of
legislative explanation with regard to the BFOQ provision. In the Con-
gressional hearings held prior to the passage of the bill, there was little
mention or discussion of that portion of the ADEA. In the Senate hear-
ings, BFOQ was twice discussed in reference to the training of older
individuals when the training is expensive and mandatory retirement age
at sixty-five is close at hand.72 The House hearings are equally devoid
of explanatory reference, 73 and the House Report on the bill simply re-
stated the language of the Act. There was also an additional note to
the effect that Congress did not intend the Act to overrule requirements
imposed by regulatory agencies as to the physical qualifications of
drivers in the trucking industry.74
It is worth noting in this context that subsequent to the passage of
the ADEA, Congress passed the Railroad Safety Act7 5 which, it can be
argued, was the first recent opportunity Congress has had to examine
the simultaneous impact of safety and age limitations. The House Re-
port on that bill stated that "the phrase 'except such qualifications as
are specifically related to safety' [should] not be construed to give the
Secretary any authority to prescribe a regulation or standard which
might disqualify an employee for safety reasons solely by reason of
age."76  To these authors' knowledge, this argument has not been made,
as yet, before a court involved in a BFOQ determination.
Coupled with the lack of legislative history is the apparent existence
of unstated assumptions regarding older persons within the judiciary
12 Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48-49 (1967). Senator Yarborough, Chairman of the Subcommittee, commented
that pilots of supersonic aircraft would be covered by the Act. Id. at 52 (statement of
Senator Yarborough).
73 The only noteworthy statement relative to this issue was made by Congressman
Dent, Chairman of the Subcommittee, in which he said: "But I can't see the logic of as-
suming that a person over 40 or 45 or 50 is physically unfit without even taking the time
to make an examination or give an examination to determine whether or not he can meet
production figures." Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on H.R. 3651, H.R.
3768, and H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of Congressman Dent).
74 H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2213, 2220. The House Report also mentioned that in some industries such as
railroads in which a disproportionately high number of older workers are employed,
employers should not be prevented from achieving a reasonable age balance. Id. at 2219.
75 45 U.S.C. §§ 421, 431-441 (1970).
76 H.R. REP. No. 91-1194, 9 1st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 4104, 4115.
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which are similar to those of society at large. Commentators have sug-
gested that a common reason for not hiring older workers is the assump-
tion of physical deterioration,7 7 which supposedly makes them less able
to meet the physical demands of their job.78  Yet countless studies con-
ducted to date indicate that age-based generalizations are without valid-
ity even in regard to reflexes and physical stamina.79 However, such a
bias would help explain the willingness of the Seventh Circuit to accept
the generalized assertions made by Greyhound in defense of its age limi-
tation, as well as some of the remarks made by the district court judge
in Tamiami.80
V. CONCLUSION
A closer look at the history of that portion of the Fifth Circuit BFOQ
test enunciated in Weeks reveals the careless method of its develop-
ment. Part of the Weeks decision speaks to the impracticality of dealing
with the protected group on an individualized basis. This statement was
contained in footnote five of the opinion, and was made in reference to
the district court decision in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.81 In the lat-
ter case, the lower court had found that since it was not pragmatically
possible for the employer to assess the individual capabilities of each
female applicant, the employer was not required to do so.2 Subse-
quent to the Weeks decision, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed
Bowe and required the company to allow each applicant, male or fe-
male, to be tested individually to determine adequacy. sa Thus, foot-
note five appears to have been included so as to avoid a possible con-
flict with another circuit court - a conflict which never materialized.84
It is worth noting that the "all or substantially all" language of the
'7 Kavorski & Kavorski, supra note 35, at 845.
78 See Note, Mandatory Retirement - A Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51 CHic.-
KENT L. REv. 116, 118 (1974); Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionality of Mandatory
Retirement Plans, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 150, 158-59 (1971).
71 See Note, Mandatory Retirement - A Vehicle For Age Discrimination, 51 CHic.-
KENT L. REV. 116, 119-20 (1974); Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionality of Manda-
tory Retirement Plans, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 150, 159-61 (1971); Note, The Constitutional
Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 748, 773-75 (1975);
Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative
Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1317 (1974). For a discussion of aging in relation to
driving skills, see T. PLANCK, W. MANN, & E. WEINER, AGE AND HIGHWAY SAFETY: THE
ELDERLY IN A MoenE SoCIEr 3, 22-23, 32 (1975), and J. BOrwINICK, AGING AND BEHAVIOR
174 (1973).
'0 It was urged on behalf of the company in Tamiami that it is only "common sense
to recognize that it is certainly more difficult for a 45-year-old man or a 50-year-old man
to adjust to these [uncertain] working conditions [on extra-board] than it would be for
someone younger." Brief for Appellant at 42, Usery v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 531
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976'.
"1 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), modified, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
82 Id. at 357.
s3 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969).
84 The Weeks court stated in footnote five that "[lit may be that where an employer
sustains its burden in demonstrating that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with
women on an individualized basis, it may apply a reasonable general rule." Weeks v.




main text of Weeks was formulated during a period when there was a
degree of court hostility to the Title VII sex discrimination provisions.
8 5
Certainly, the Weeks language was not as expansive as that of other cir-
cuit courts which considered the BFOQ problem.86
The Department of Labor's failure to launch a case-in-chief has also
contributed to the present BFOQ jumble. 7 This was understandable in
view of prior case law which placed the burden upon the employer
seeking the exception.8  In addition, the Department failed to seek
hearings from the Department of Transportation regarding an appro-
priate age limit for bus drivers, which undoubtedly disturbed the author
of the Fifth Circuit decision.89 Had the Department sought and ob-
tained a favorable ruling from the Transportation Department, the courts
might have been less reticent in enforcing the ADEA despite a safety
issue. At the very least, it would have allowed the courts to avoid re-
sponsibility for the consequences of enforcing the Act's prohibition.
It should now be clear that the original formula devised in Weeks
is inadequate to deal with such sensitive issues as safety and society's
bias regarding age. As long as the current quagmire surrounding the
interpretation of BFOQ continues, the Congressionally-mandated goal
of promoting employment of older persons based on ability rather than
age will remain unfulfilled. 90
" See generally Note, Female Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification for
Position of Airline Flight Cabin Attendant, 17 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 242, 24344 (1971);
Note, Sex-Plus: The Failure of the Attempt to Subvert the Sex Provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 83 (1971); 6 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 758 (1972).
16 See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Rosenfleld v.
Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
17 See Brief for Appellant at 34-38, Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1975); Brief for Appellee at 36-44, Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499
F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974). The sum of these arguments was that once the Department
had proven a prima facie case of discrimination, it was incumbent upon the defendent to
go forward with the evidence. The Department contented itself with attempting to under-
mine the employer's evidence, rather than attempting to prove that many older workers
were qualified.
" See cases cited in note 11 supra. See also A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S.
490, 493 (1944); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir.
1969); Rosen v. PubEc Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 462 (D. N.J. 1970).
"9 See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 239 (5th Cir. 1976).
90 On November 28, 1977, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the McDonnell-
Douglas case. In view of the possible narrow interpretation of the Eighth Circuit's opinion
suggested earlier, the full import of this denial cannot be clearly determined, and resolu-
tion of the present BFOQ controversy must await more definitive treatment by the Supreme
Court or by Congress.
1977]
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss1/6
